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Abstract:  The existing liberal international economic order was constructed during the era of 
American hegemony and heavily shaped by US power.  How is the rise of China affecting 
global economic governance?  This article analyzes the case of export credit, which has long 
been considered a highly effective international regulatory regime and an important 
component of global trade governance.  I show that the rise of China is profoundly altering 
the landscape of export credit and undermining its governance arrangements.  State-backed 
export credit is a key tool of China’s development strategy, yet I argue that an explosion in 
China’s use of export credit is eroding the efficacy of existing international rules intended to 
prevent a competitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit.  The case of export credit 
highlights a fundamental tension between liberal institutions of global governance and the 
development objectives of emerging powers. 
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For over half a century, the global economy and its governing institutions have been 
dominated by the United States and other advanced-industrialized states.  The existing liberal 
international economic order was constructed during the era of American hegemony and 
heavily shaped by US power (Gilpin 1981; Ikenberry 2009).  From its hegemonic position in 
the international system, the US engaged in an unprecedented building of multilateral 
institutions and rules to govern an increasingly integrated global economy, based broadly on 
the principles of open markets and trade.  Yet the global political economy is currently in a 
period of profound change:  after decades of extraordinary growth, China has emerged as the 
world’s largest exporter and second largest economy.  Regardless of whether or not we are in 
the midst of a full-blown hegemonic transition from the US to China, the latter’s rise is 
undoubtedly reshaping the global economy.  A central question and subject of debate is how 
contemporary power shifts will affect global economic governance (Breslin 2013; Lesage and 
Van de Graaf 2015; Lipscy 2017; Scott and Wilkinson 2013). 
The present article contributes to this debate by analyzing the case of export credit, an 
important and increasingly contentious area of economic policy and international 
negotiations, which, to date, has received comparatively little attention from scholars of 
international political economy.  The governments of most major economies use export credit 
– loans and other forms of financing to assist foreign buyers in purchasing goods and services 
from national exporters – to promote their exports.  If provided at below-market rates, state-
backed export credit may act as a subsidy.  Government-supported export financing therefore 
has far-reaching consequences for international trade patterns (Wright 2011).   
As I will show, the global dynamics of export credit are being transformed by 
contemporary power shifts, with significant implications for global governance.  The existing 
system of governance for export credit – which limits the ability of states to use export credit 
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to subsidize, and thus artificially boost, their exports – was created under the auspices of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1970s and 
repeatedly strengthened since then.  For decades, export credit has been viewed as a 
successful global governance regime (Levit 2004; Moravcsik 1989; Shaffer et al. 2015), with 
its system of disciplines proving highly effective in restricting the use of export credit as a 
form of state subsidy.   
However, I demonstrate that the rise of China – who is not a member of the OECD 
nor bound by its rules – has profoundly altered the landscape of export credit and disrupted 
its governance arrangements.  Over the past two decades, China has emerged as the world’s 
largest supplier of export credit, providing volumes of financing four times greater than any 
other state.  State-backed export credit is a key tool of China’s development strategy, used to 
foster industrial upgrading and the international expansion of its domestic firms and 
industries.  Yet I argue that the dramatic increase in the use of export credit by China, as well 
as other major emerging economies, is eroding the efficacy of existing international rules 
intended to prevent a competitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit.  The 
disruption of the export credit regime highlights the conflict between the liberal principles of 
the existing global governance architecture and the economic development objectives of the 
emerging powers.1 
Clash of Powers:  Liberal Global Governance versus the Developmental State 
Current power shifts have produced considerable debate about the implications for the 
liberal international economic order.  Scholars in the realist tradition of international relations 
hold a pessimistic view of the prospects for multilateral cooperation amid shifting power.  In 
the context of waning American dominance, realists foresee conflict, based on the view that 
1 This analysis draws on interviews conducted between 2015-2018 at the OECD, WTO and national capitals, 
with over 45 negotiators and senior government officials, as well as extensive documentary research. 
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emerging powers like China hold fundamentally different interests and agendas than those of 
established powers and are therefore system-challengers rather than system-supporters 
(Gilpin 1981; Kupchan 2014).  It is assumed that China and other rising powers will reject 
the rules, norms and principles of the liberal economic order created by the Western powers 
(Bremmer and Roubini 2011; Castañeda 2010; Kupchan 2014).  Realists thus view power 
shifts as destabilizing and a threat to the global economic architecture (Patrick 2010).  In 
contrast, liberal institutionalism is considerably more optimistic about the prospects for 
multilateralism and the maintenance of the liberal economic order amid a relative decline of 
US power (Keohane 1984).  Many envision integrating new powers into the Western-made 
liberal world order, by socializing China and other emerging powers into existing global 
governance institutions (Johnson 2003) and reforming those institutions to incorporate 
emerging powers (Ikenberry 2009).  It is assumed that having benefited from a relatively 
open, liberal global economy, emerging powers like China will have an interest in 
participating in and maintaining the system that supports it (Nye 2015).  The old and new 
powers will therefore find ways to jointly manage the international economic architecture and 
cooperation will prevail.   
There are thus major debates among scholars, policymakers, and foreign policy 
analysts about China’s objectives and intentions – whether it will challenge or support the 
existing international economic order – as well as whether its rise is likely to generate 
conflict or enhanced cooperation and what its implications are for global economic 
governance.  The case of export credit provides an important point of empirical intervention 
into these debates.  From the perspective of economic liberalism, export credit has constituted 
an example of a successful global regulatory regime.  Over time, the system of governance 
created under the OECD virtually eliminated the subsidy component of export credit, limiting 
state provision of export credit mainly to addressing market failure, while preventing states 
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from using export credit to artificially distort markets and trade flows, thereby avoiding a 
costly and self-defeating subsidy war.   
Yet as I will show, export credit now illustrates how liberal global governance 
institutions are threatened by contemporary power shifts.  Export credit, I contend, represents 
a case of what Lavenex, Serrano and Büthe in the introduction to this special issue identify as 
“regime-disrupting” change, in which emerging powers reject existing international 
regulatory models.  To situate this within their introductory framework, in this issue-area, the 
status quo ante was a working export credit regime under the OECD.  Originally, China was 
simply outside the system altogether.  Now, however, China has built capacity – for 
combining expertise and resources to implement export credit policy effectively – and 
capability – to recognize its preferences and act accordingly – on a massive scale.  China has 
emerged as the world’s largest provider of export credit but refused to participate in the 
established governance regime or to accept international disciplines on its use of export 
credit.   
While power transitions are causing regime disruption, this is not due to an 
unwillingness on the part of the established powers or the existing regime to accommodate 
China or other rising powers.  Although based at the OECD, states are not required to be 
OECD members to participate in the existing system of rules governing export credit.  The 
US and other established powers have been eager to either incorporate China into the current 
regime or engage it in the construction of a new one, but China has resisted both options.  
The issue is a fundamental incompatibility of preferences:  China’s preferences diverge from 
the established powers’ preferences as enshrined in the export credit regime.  China has 
developed preferences that are, in game-theoretic language, simply deadlock preference:  
there is no overlap of win-sets of China and the US/OECD coalition at the core of the export 
credit regime.  Efforts to accommodate China within the regime have therefore failed.  In this 
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case, China is a regime-undermining spoiler:  given the scale of its export credit activities, 
China’s non-participation threatens to destabilize the export credit regime. 
Contrary to the expectations of liberal institutionalism, changes in the distribution of 
power are undermining the global regulatory regime for export credit.  However, while the 
case of export credit accords with realist predictions regarding the disruptive nature of 
shifting power, it nonetheless challenges the implicit normative assumptions underlying 
many accounts of contemporary power shifts.  As Amitav Acharya (2014) argues, the 
dominant narrative – whether realist or liberal – tends to take for granted the inherent 
goodness and desirability of the liberal order created under US hegemony.  Accordingly, as 
Randall Schweller (2011) indicates, those who predict growing disorder due to China’s rise 
typically assume that its goals must be illegitimate if they clash with the existing US-led 
liberal world order.  Much analysis of China and other emerging powers has been shaped by 
a narrow framework for understanding their agendas and impact:  if they do not support the 
status quo, rising powers are labelled “spoilers” or “shirkers” (Schweller 2011).  The 
disruptive effects of emerging powers are attributed to the fact that they are “irresponsible” 
(Patrick 2010), “troublemakers” (Kirshner 2012), who hold inappropriate “core values” 
(Castañeda 2010) and lack an adequate sense of “international civic duty” (Hampson and 
Heinbecker 2011).   
The case of export credit, however, problematizes such interpretations.  From the 
perspective of the established powers or the regime they have created, China is indeed a 
spoiler, and it is easy to point to China as the problem and dismiss its stance – undermining 
the export credit regime by refusing to participate in it – as irresponsible.  However, while 
contemporary power shifts are disrupting the global governance of export credit, as I will 
demonstrate, it is not simply because China is irresponsible or recalcitrant, but because it has 
legitimate objectives that conflict with the overarching goals of the regime.  The disruption of 
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the international export credit regime is rooted in a fundamental conflict between the interests 
of the old and new powers:  the US and other established powers have an interest in 
preserving the liberal regime they created, with states voluntarily cooperating to restrict their 
use of export credit to prevent a destructive, competitive spiral of subsidization, whereas 
China and other emerging powers have an interest in maintaining their ability to use export 
credit as part of their strategies for national development.  This is, in short, a clash between 
liberalism and development. 
Under the neoliberal model that has dominated development thinking since the 1980s, 
the objective of liberalizing global markets and constraining the scope for state intervention 
appeared highly compatible with the goal of fostering development.  According to the 
“Washington Consensus” propagated by multilateral economic institutions like the IMF and 
World Bank, developing countries were told that significantly reducing the role of the state 
and liberalizing markets represented the best path to development (Chorev and Babb 2009).  
But that model has increasingly been challenged.  Empirically, for many developing 
countries, neoliberalism resulted in deindustrialization and economic stagnation (Bayliss et 
al. 2011).  Furthermore, the states that showed the most impressive development gains in 
recent decades – such as China, India and Brazil – frequently deviated from the strict dictates 
of the Washington Consensus and made use of distinctly illiberal, state-led development 
policies (Ban and Blyth 2013).   
Consequently, development economists and policymakers have increasingly signaled 
a rejection of market fundamentalism and a renewed appreciation of the importance of an 
active state engaged in promoting development by fostering industrial upgrading, supporting 
the competitiveness of national industries and helping them to move up the value chain into 
higher value-added activities, and thereby boosting growth, incomes and the quality of 
employment (Lazonick 2008; Lin and Chang 2009; Rodrik 2008; Stiglitz et al. 2013).  Even 
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the OECD – host of the export credit regime – has recognized this “renaissance of industrial 
policy” (Warwick 2013; OECD 2013).  Certainly, China has emphasized the role of the state 
as a critical actor in development, and industrial policy is central to its strategy for continued 
economic development (Ban and Blyth 2013; Nölke et al. 2015). 
There is growing recognition that states need to deviate from the principles of 
liberalism and to pursue certain illiberal policies in order to develop.  In all successful 
developers, the state has played a vital role in supporting industrial development (Chang 
2002; Lazonick 2008; OECD 2013: 105; Warwick 2013).  Even the US and other advanced-
industrialized states relied on a range of interventionist policies during their own processes of 
economic development, including using tariffs and subsidies to foster the growth of infant 
industries and sequence their integration into the global economy, aggressively adopting 
technology from more advanced countries, and controlling the inflow of foreign investment 
to direct it toward the goals of national development (Chang 2002; Gallagher 2008).  From 
China’s perspective, in seeking to preserve scope for state intervention to promote industrial 
development, it is simply seeking to follow in the footsteps of the US and other advanced-
industrialized states.  Moreover, state-backed export credit, in particular, has historically been 
a core industrial policy instrument employed by successful late developers (World Bank 
1993: 358-66).   
The case of export credit thus underscores the fundamental tension between the 
developmental state and liberal global governance institutions.  If development requires 
significant scope for state intervention, then can this be accommodated in, or reconciled with, 
governance institutions – such as the regime for export credit – predicated on the liberal 
principle that states should not intervene in the economy beyond providing basic public 
goods and correcting market failures?  From the perspective of the US and other established 
powers, the export credit regime and its disciplines are essential to fostering an open and fair 
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global trading system, with competition taking place on a level playing field undistorted by 
state subsidies.  But from the perspective of China and other emerging economies, a system 
that constrains their scope for development by requiring them to relinquish their use of an 
important industrial policy tool cannot be considered fair:  what the established powers 
perceive as a level playing field is, in fact, one that serves to perpetuate their industrial and 
economic supremacy.  There is thus an inherent conflict between the objectives of the 
established powers and those of emerging challengers.  Although China’s objectives are no 
less valid than those of the US and other established powers, they nonetheless threaten to 
undermine the existing liberal governance regime for export credit.   
What is Export Credit? 
Trade finance is a critical, but understudied, aspect of the global political economy.  
Approximately 80-90% of world trade relies on some form of financing, with over $10 
trillion in trade finance provided annually (Akhtar 2015).  Most trade finance comes from the 
private sector, but states also play a vital role in financing trade.2  Every major economy has 
an export credit agency (ECA) that provides various forms of financing to facilitate and 
expand exports, including direct loans to foreign buyers, insurance and loan guarantees, 
working capital financing, and finance for large-scale infrastructure and industrial projects.  
Each ECA functions as a public or semipublic bank, borrowing from the national treasury or 
public capital markets and using the funds to finance exports (Moravcsik 1989).  To quote 
one official, “If trade is the engine that drives the increasingly integrated global economy, 
export credit is the fuel that powers it” (Konno 1998: 95).   
The volume of capital provided in this way is substantial:  approximately 60 ECAs are 
now in operation worldwide, providing $300 billion in trade-related finance annually (Akhtar 
2 Private sector financing includes loans, letters of credit, guarantees, insurance and factoring, provided by 
exporters or financial institutions. 
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2015; Exim 2015).  In some countries, state-backed export credit supports as much as 20% of 
exports, and total ECA authorizations account for more than 5% of GDP (NAM 2014).  
Official export credit plays a major role in financing capital goods exports – “big-ticket” 
exports, such as aircraft, satellites, transportation equipment, manufacturing and agricultural 
machinery, energy and mining equipment, power plants, and major infrastructure projects – 
which often involves long-term financing of complex, multi-billion dollar sales (Hufbauer et 
al. 2011).  ECA support can make transactions more commercially attractive by mitigating 
risks of financing or providing another source of funding to diversify risks.  In Britain, for 
example, UK Export Finance (UKEF) supports the aerospace sector by supplying financing 
to facilitate the sale of Airbus jets with Rolls-Royce engines to foreign buyers.  Given the 
size of these transactions, the purchasing airlines rarely pay cash and instead require loans to 
make the purchase possible.  UKEF can provide direct loans when commercial financing is 
unavailable, or guarantee (and thereby reduce the cost of) commercial loans.  For many 
countries, state provision of export credit is a core part of their industrial policy and national 
export strategies.   
The principal governance issue related to export credit arises from the fact that it may 
be subsidized by states as a means to promote exports.  Since an ECA is a state agency with 
access to capital at low government rates, state-backed export credit is usually offered at 
interest rates below those that would be charged on the market for similar loans, if such loans 
are available at all (Moravcsik 1989).  However, an ECA may also go further and subsidize 
interest rates directly, by lending at rates below its own cost of borrowing.  Given that 
financing often represents a significant portion of a large capital goods transaction or 
infrastructure project, even modest government credit subsidies can be a decisive factor in 
awarding a bid.  Like other forms of export subsidies, without global regulation, the natural 
tendency would be for states to offer increasingly higher subsidies in an effort to give their 
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exports an advantage in global markets, distorting trade flows and triggering a costly subsidy 
war that would drain national budgets (Coppens 2014; Levit 2004; Wright 2011). 
The Global Governance of Export Credit 
The use of export credit by states is governed by a set of rules established at the 
OECD, an institution comprised primarily of advanced-industrialized states and thus often 
described as a “rich man’s club”.  Efforts to establish disciplines on government-backed 
export financing began in the 1970s.  Many states were already providing subsidized 
financing at below market rates, but the oil shocks provoked the outbreak of an export credit 
war (Moravcsik 1989).  Rising oil prices resulted in large trade deficits in most OECD 
countries, which prompted heightened competition over export markets.  Governments 
increasingly turned to using subsidized export credit in a competitive race to “win” exports, 
leading to rising levels of subsidization across the advanced-industrialized countries.  In a 
context of high interest rates, supporting large export contracts became increasingly 
expensive for states, burdening national budgets amid growing deficits (Vassard 2015). 
The US led the creation of the current international regime governing export credit.  
As Andrew Moravcsik (1989: 199) details, the hegemonic power of the US played a crucial 
role in the creation of the regime and lent decisive support to liberalization efforts.  The US’s 
interest in eliminating subsidies provided “the catalyst that sparked serious negotiations” and 
the US assumed leadership of the negotiations, with its initiatives driving the formation, and 
subsequent extension, of the export credit regime.  There was a relatively large degree of 
consensus among states on the desirability of an international regime, but where necessary at 
several crucial junctures, the US used the exercise of coercive power to overcome resistance 
from recalcitrant countries, such as France and Japan, with more interventionist economic 
models and greater support for subsidies.   
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The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (“the Arrangement”) was 
created in 1978.3  Its disciplines place strict limits on the financing packages that ECAs may 
offer to borrowers.  Its highly specific and technical provisions define the most favorable 
terms under which credit may be granted (including minimum interest rates and premiums, 
term-to-maturity, down payment, and repayment schedules).  These conditions are designed 
to automatically adjust based on changes in capital markets and commercial interest rates.  
The Arrangement includes disciplines on tied aid, as well as additional sector-specific 
understandings governing the terms and conditions of export financing for commercial 
aircraft, ships, nuclear power plants, renewable energy, coal-fired power plants, and railway 
infrastructure.  Since its creation, the Arrangement has been continuously revised and 
updated to tighten its disciplines, close loopholes and adapt to changing circumstances 
(Moravcsik 1989; Vassard 2015).  In addition to being the key driver behind the 
Arrangement’s creation, the US was also the primary force behind this continual 
strengthening of its disciplines, designed to bring the global provision of export credit closer 
to market principles (Hall 2011; Coppens 2014). 
Transparency is a critical aspect of the governance regime for export credit.  The 
Arrangement sets out detailed procedures for mandatory notification and exchange of 
information on credit practices.  The system provides what participants describe as “real time 
transparency” – a procedure and forum for reporting on impending transactions, exchanging 
confidential transaction data, and resolving disagreements before a transaction is completed.  
A participant is allowed to deviate from the terms of the Arrangement if they follow its 
notification process, providing other participants with the opportunity to match the terms of 
that bid by offering the same level of support; this threat of matching acts as a powerful 
3 The most recent version of the Arrangement is OECD 2018a.  Participants are the US, EU, Japan, 
Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland.  Israel and Turkey are observers. 
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enforcement mechanism for the Arrangement’s provisions (Coppens 2014).  As described by 
a senior OECD official, “everyone knows what the best terms available are, so no one 
worries about what terms competing governments might offer. … There are no secret 
financing terms and, thus, no competitive advantages to be gained from deviating from the 
rules” (Drysdale 2015).  The transparency and monitoring mechanisms built into the regime 
encourage participants to conform to its disciplines and provide confidence that others are 
doing the same. 
 The Arrangement is not a formal treaty and has no formal enforcement mechanisms; 
instead, it is an informal, consensus-based “Gentleman’s Agreement”.  Yet despite its status 
as mere “soft law”, the Arrangement has proven to be a highly effective regulatory regime.  
As Janet Koven Levit (2004: 68) demonstrates, the Arrangement has succeeded in achieving 
“thorough, deep, sustained compliance” among its participants.  OECD and ECA officials 
themselves report that non-compliance is extremely rare.  Many argue that its soft law status 
has, in fact, been an advantage – ensuring that the Arrangement is flexible and adaptable and 
can more easily be reviewed, modified, amended, and strengthened (Bonucci 2011; Levit 
2004).  The Arrangement has built trust among its participants and a shared understanding of 
appropriate practices that has significantly shaped state behavior (Shaffer et al. 2015). 
As a result, the existing regulatory regime for export credit is widely identified as a 
successful institution of global economic governance (Levit 2004; Moravcsik 1989; Shaffer 
et al. 2015).  In the words of one ECA official, “over years and years of tightening its 
disciplines, the Arrangement has evolved to largely eliminate the subsidy component of 
export credit.”4  Its rules have enabled ECAs to fill gaps in the availability of commercial 
financing and facilitate the expansion of trade without distorting global markets, ensuring that 
exports compete on the basis of price and quality rather than subsidized financing (Wright 
4 Interview, July 2016. 
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2011).5  To quote a negotiator, the OECD Arrangement has been “very effective in terms of 
creating a level playing field and creating a situation where governments are complementing 
rather than competing with or crowding out the private sector.”6  In short, as one OECD 
official summed it up, “the export credit world has been really peaceful because of the 
Arrangement.”7 
WTO rules on export subsidies prohibit subsidized export credit; however, as detailed 
below, in practice, export credit is extremely difficult to police via the WTO.  The smaller 
forum of the OECD became the institutional home of the export credit regime because it 
offered a more nimble and effective means of governing export credit (Moravcsik 1989).  
The Arrangement is not a universal agreement, but a form of club governance.  It operates as 
a system of mutual self-restraint in the provision of state-backed export credit:  while its 
participants are in direct competition with one another for export markets, they nonetheless 
abide by a common set of rules governing the terms of that competition.  OECD membership 
is not required to join the Arrangement:  any significant export credit provider is eligible to 
participate.   
Export credit is what Robert Keohane (1982: 351) calls a “control-oriented regime”, 
in which, through a set of institutionalized arrangements, “members maintain some degree of 
control over each other’s behavior, thus decreasing harmful externalities arising from 
independent action as well as reducing uncertainty stemming from uncoordinated activity.”  
Control-oriented regimes, like that for export credit, seek to regulate the behavior of their 
members.  The condition for a mutual-control regime to be effective, however, is that all 
significant actors within the issue-area being regulated must be members of the regime 
5 As with any mechanism that restricts export subsidies, the Arrangement could be seen as harming importers, 
since credit subsidies reduce their costs.  However, Arrangement participants are also importers of goods and 
services backed by foreign ECAs. 
6 Interview, July 2015. 
7 Interview, June 2016. 
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(Keohane 1982: 353).  When the Arrangement was created, and for several decades 
afterwards, it covered all of the world’s major export credit providers – which were then 
exclusively rich countries.  Since developing countries were not significant providers of 
export credit, there was no reason for them to be subject to such disciplines and their non-
participation did not undermine the regime’s functioning.8  Now, however, the club model of 
governance for export credit centered on the advanced-industrialized states of the OECD is 
coming under strain, as major providers of export credit – such as China – emerge outside the 
club and show little interest in joining.  
Changing Global Dynamics of Export Credit 
In recent years, the global landscape of export credit has changed dramatically due to 
an explosion in export credit provision by China and other emerging powers.  Between 2000 
and 2014, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) increased their official export 
financing from less than 3% to 40% of the world total (Exim 2015).  The vast majority of this 
increase has come from China, who constitutes 90% of the medium and long-term trade-
related official support activity of the BRIC countries and is now the world’s largest export 
credit provider.  In 2014, China supplied $58 billion in export credit support – far more than 
the $12 billion provided by the US and, indeed, more than all the G7 rich countries combined 
– plus an additional $43 billion in overseas investment financing to promote its exports 
(Figure 1).  As one US export credit official stated regarding China’s provision of export 
credit:  “They just dwarf everyone else.”9  
 
  
8 No developing country has joined the Arrangement, with the exception of Brazil, which is a participant in the 
Aircraft Sector Understanding but has shown no interest in joining the larger Arrangement.  South Korea joined 
the Arrangement in 1997, once it was already a developed country.  Some emerging economies, including 
Turkey, Poland, Mexico and Chile, are members of the OECD but not participants in the Arrangement.  They 
are not major providers of export credit and their use of export credit has never been large enough to be seen as 
a threat to the Arrangement or to concern its participants.  Poland, for instance, provides only 0.39% of total 
OECD export credit, Turkey 0.16%, and Mexico 0%, while Chile does not have an ECA (OECD 2018b). 
9 Interview, July 2015. 
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Figure 1:  Export Credit Volumes, 2014 
 
Source:  Exim 2015. 
 
The expansion in China’s use of export credit is closely tied to its evolving 
development strategy.  After 40 years of rapid economic growth, China is reaching the limits 
of a growth model centered on low-wage, labor-intensive production of basic consumer 
goods, as the country faces slowing growth and rising labor costs.  According to Chinese 
policymakers, “China has entered a critical stage of economic restructuring” in which it faces 
“the challenge of optimizing and upgrading its industrial structure” in order to “escape the 
middle-income trap and develop into a high-income country” (DRC 2014).  China’s officials 
see industrial upgrading as “the only way out” of underdevelopment, but “a long uphill 
battle” in which the state must play an active role (DRC 2014).   
The Chinese government identifies advanced manufacturing as the answer “for China 
as it seeks a new economic driver and a new global competitive edge” (Jing and Man-ki 
2015).  China is seeking to transform its economy and move into more technology-intensive 
and higher-value-added industries.  With its “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy, China 
has targeted ten priority sectors:  information technology, robotics, aerospace, vehicles, rail 











biopharmaceuticals and medical equipment, and agricultural machinery.  China’s stated goal 
is to enable its manufacturing sector to “catch-up” with advanced-industrialized countries by 
2025 and ultimately to be a world-leading manufacturing power by 2049.   
Export credit is a key part of China’s developmental state toolkit.  It is one of the 
prime means by which China is deploying its newfound financial power to give its firms a 
competitive advantage in global markets, while fostering industrial upgrading and the 
development of strategic sectors.  The country has three ECAs – China Eximbank, China 
Development Bank, and Sinosure – and, as one US trade official put it, “Now China is sitting 
on huge reserves, and they probably more than anyone can afford to subsidize.”10  Promoting 
China’s exports through state-backed export credit is a strategy that comes from the State 
Council and is implemented by these state-owned policy banks (CDB, Eximbank) and insurer 
(Sinosure) in close coordination with Chinese firms (Downs 2011).  China’s policy banks are 
funded through bond issues (80% of which are bought by China’s state-owned commercial 
banks), and also receive periodic cash infusions from state coffers and China’s massive 
foreign exchange reserves; in 2015, for example, China Eximbank and CDB received capital 
injections totaling $93 billion (Kong and Gallagher 2017).  Since the late-1990s, China has 
undertaken substantial administrative reforms to improve the performance of its policy banks, 
building highly effective institutions for delivering export credit:  its ECAs are well-
resourced and professionalized, with considerable expertise (Downs 2011; Sanderson and 
Forsythe 2012).  China has thus developed substantial institutional capacity and capability in 
this area.   
On export credit, there is a convergence between the strategic objectives of the 
Chinese government and the commercial interests of its firms.  Its ECAs and business work 
closely together to structure and execute transactions, which advance both national and 
10 Interview, March 2009. 
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corporate interests concurrently (Downs 2011).  A representative of a rival ECA 
characterized China’s strategy as follows: 
What China does is develop an industry domestically, then uses export credit to 
make markets for them abroad.  There’s a strategically well-implemented plan 
to start an industry, grow that industry and then internationalize it, and these 
are the three agencies that do it for them.  And what we’ve seen is that when 
they pick a sector, they can dominate it.  They start domestically, then use 
below-market financing to start moving into emerging markets in Africa, Latin 
America, and poorer parts of Asia, then into industrialized countries like the 
US, EU, Canada.  They’re not in it for the short-term game.  They’re in it for 
the long-term, 50 years down the road, when they’ll be dominating every sector 
economically.  There is a plan and they’ve done it damn well so far – and 
there’s no sign anyone is about to slow it down.11 
 
As a result, he continued:  “Frankly, everyone can see what’s coming and everyone is scared 
to death.”  While other successful recent developers, such as the East Asian newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) – Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong – also made use 
of export credit as part of their development strategies (World Bank 1993), China has been 
characterized as conducting “the most aggressive export credit financing campaign in 
history” (Ezell 2011).  And this strategy is proving highly effective.  To quote one WTO 
official:  “In almost every capital goods sector, China is going from a bit player to being one 
of the biggest.”12  
Export credit has been the driving force behind the much-publicized expansion of 
China’s activities in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere (Bräutigam 2009; Gallagher et al. 
2012).  While often mistakenly described as aid, much of China’s overseas lending is in fact 
export credit – loans tied to the export of Chinese goods (Bräutigam 2009).  China’s massive 
new Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides similar avenues for using its financial might to 
support its industries and the “going out” of Chinese enterprises abroad.  Although 
considerably smaller in scale, the other BRICs are using export credit strategically in key 
11 Interview, July 2015. 
12 Interview, July 2016. 
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sectors to significant effect – including Brazil in construction, Russia in nuclear energy, and 
India in transportation and energy.  Given the extremely large volumes of financing it is 
providing, China’s use of export credit is seen as a serious competitive challenge to the US, 
EU and other advanced-industrialized states and the most significant threat to the export 
credit regime.  
Erosion of the Export Credit Governance Regime 
While the global regulatory regime centered on the OECD Arrangement worked 
effectively to govern export credit until recently, its disciplines are now being undermined by 
the substantial increase in export credit provision by China and other emerging economies.  
The international export credit regime addresses what Arthur Stein (1982) calls a “dilemma 
of common interests,” where cooperation is necessary to avoid an undesirable outcome (in 
this case, a war of competitive subsidization that could destabilize the trading system) but 
individually each state has an incentive to deviate (by providing credit subsidies to support 
their exports).  As Stein (1982: 312-3) states, “All regimes intended to deal with dilemmas of 
common interests must specify strict patterns of behavior and insure that no one cheats.”  
This requires institutional structures for policing compliance:  the regime must specify “what 
constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of its own ability to spot others’ cheating 
immediately,” through “verification and monitoring procedures” that ensure cheating is 
“observable.”  Accordingly, the export credit regime has developed a detailed set of rules 
defining the terms on which states are allowed to provide export credit, with extensive 
monitoring procedures to ensure compliance.  For the regime to work, however, states need 
assurance that their competitors are not cheating; China’s absence therefore presents a 
significant problem. 
Information-sharing is recognized as one of the most important functions of regimes 
(Keohane 1984).  Uncertainty about other states’ behavior, and the difficulty of observing 
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others’ actions clearly, is a significant obstacle to international cooperation (Koremenos et al 
2001).  International regimes reduce risk and uncertainty by increasing the flow of 
information among member states, making regimes most valuable in cases where information 
is asymmetrically distributed (Keohane 1984).  In the case of export credit, where states have 
extensive information about their own activities but not those of others, a central function of 
the Arrangement is providing increased transparency and information-sharing among 
participants:  indeed, its “detailed transparency provisions” have been identified as the “most 
important part of the regime” (Moravsik 1989: 204).  By requiring states to provide 
information about their export credit activities, the transparency provisions of the regime act 
as both a method of monitoring and an incentive for compliance with its disciplines, and have 
therefore played a crucial role in ensuring its stability.   
The Agreement’s information-sharing requirements provide a powerful deterrence 
against cheating by giving other participants the opportunity to match the terms of any bid a 
state is providing.  Since China is not subject to the regime’s reporting requirements, 
however, states have no means to verify and monitor its behavior and no assurance that it will 
not subsidize.  As an ECA official stated:   
If you want to provide export credit, you provide a confidential notification to 
Arrangement participants with the details of the transaction, with all the 
specific terms of the transaction going out to all of your competitor ECAs.  So 
participants are constantly monitoring each other’s activities.  The only 
recourse is matching, but everyone agrees this surveillance mechanism works.  
Because the moment you break the terms, your competitors will just do the 
same thing.  Whereas if China wants to break the terms, it just does it.  There’s 
nothing to stop them – and we won’t even know it’s happening.13  
 
Other states cannot know the frequency or extent to which China is breaching the 
Arrangement, but they know China has strong incentives to do so.  Moreover, China’s 
unwillingness to join the regime heightens distrust by signaling to participants that it wants to 
13 Interview, July 2016. 
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remain free to deviate from Arrangements terms, intensifying fears that China is using export 
credit to undercut their exports. 
Because China is not bound by the information-sharing requirements of the export 
credit regime, other states lack reliable, comprehensive information about China’s activities.  
According to an OECD study, “there is a scarcity of concrete information about the Chinese 
export credit programs, both about the types and volumes of export credit support and the 
terms and conditions for them” (Skarp 2015).  As one negotiator indicated, “In terms of the 
terms and conditions they offer, we just don’t know.  We don’t have access to that 
information.”14  Given the highly opaque and non-transparent nature of China’s financing, 
publicly available data on its export credit practices are extremely limited, and the terms and 
conditions of specific transactions are usually not known.  States are forced to rely on 
anecdotal evidence, gleaned from rare instances where Chinese lending terms have been 
leaked or otherwise become publically available. 
Based on this information, many OECD countries believe that China is using its 
ability to extend credit on more favorable terms to gain an advantage over participants in the 
Arrangement and related sectoral understandings.  According to an ECA official, “What 
China is doing is riskier transactions, with fewer rules, at slightly less cost, with longer terms 
and a lot more flexibilities – when you combine all of those things, it can be quite an 
attractive package.”15  Moreover, he continued, “They don’t have to go far off the market in 
any one term to get an overall package that is very attractive, plus they use all these side 
programs as further inducement [e.g., combining export credit with development aid].”16  
Since financing can often account for as much as 40% of the cost of a project, attractive 
14 Interview, July 2015. 
15 Interview, July 2015. 
16 Interview, July 2015. 
21 
 
                                                 
export credit terms can be enough to give China’s exports a significant competitive edge 
(Pomfret 2010).   
The issue is not just the interest rate that China is charging.  The interest rate is only 
one factor in determining the competitiveness of a loan, and thus whether state-backed 
lending will distort trade.  Relaxing other terms and conditions of lending to depart from 
prevailing market conditions can also act as a subsidy and be used to gain a competitive 
advantage.  This is why the Arrangement regulates each of the key terms and conditions of 
export credit – including the interest rate, premium rate, repayment period, grace period, 
down payment, and portion of the contract supported – to ensure a level playing field among 
participants (Figure 2).  For a non-participant like China, deviating from the Arrangement on 
any of these terms can be used to underbid competitors who are required to abide by its rules. 
 
Figure 2:  OECD Arrangement Requirements 
 
OECD Arrangement major disciplines: 
• Minimum interest rate:  commercially-indexed rates calculated monthly by the OECD 
for each participant based on the interest rate on its government bonds + 1% 
(Commercial Interest Reference Rates, CIRRs)  
• Minimum premium rate to cover credit risk:  ECAs are required to charge a premium, 
in addition to interest charges, to cover the risk of non-repayment of export credit; 
calculated based on country risk and commercial risk associated with the buyer 
• Maximum loan repayment period:  8.5 years for loans to developed countries and 10 
years for loans to developing countries; 12 and 14 years for rail infrastructure; 12 years 
for non-nuclear power plants; 18 years for nuclear power plants 
• No grace period:  the first instalment of principal and interest payment must be made 
within 6 months of the start of the credit, and a maximum of every 6 months thereafter 
• Minimum 15% down payment 
• Maximum support of 85% of export contract value 
OECD Arrangement rules on tied aid (Helsinki Package): 
• Tied aid not permitted for commercially viable projects or countries above lower-
middle-income 
• Requires a minimum concessionality level of 35% (50% for LDCs)   
 
 
Since it is not bound by Arrangement rules, China is able to offer more flexible 
financing packages and more favorable terms.  While it is believed that China’s standard 
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interest rate on export credit is generally similar to Arrangement or market terms, there are 
many instances (see examples below) where China has strategically provided lower interests 
rates (EU 2011).  Even a slightly lower rate can give Chinese exports a significant advantage:  
a difference of just 1-2% in the interest rate increases total financing costs by 18-30% for a 
12-year loan (Gallagher et al 2012).  The other key element of pricing is risk premiums.  
Under the Arrangement, the minimum interest rate a lending country must charge is based on 
its own cost of borrowing (i.e., a flat rate, irrespective of the transaction or borrower); the 
regulation of risk premium fees is therefore an essential part of the Arrangement, which 
makes government-backed financing mimic the market by requiring ECAs to charge higher 
costs for riskier transactions.  Since the premium rate charged by an ECA is often the largest 
component in the overall price of financing, a low (or no) premium rate could be the decisive 
factor in awarding a bid, making the Arrangement’s risk premium rules essential to ensuring 
a level playing field (Gonter 2011).  These fees can be considerable:  on a 10-year loan, for 
example, risk premium rates average between 6-19% of the value of the loan, depending on 
the credit-worthiness of the buyer.17  OECD countries are concerned that Chinese ECAs often 
do not charge risk premiums, and when they do, the fees do not approach the levels required 
by the Arrangement (Exim 2015).  The lack of adequate fees to cover credit risk would 
represent a significant subsidy by the Chinese government, lowering the cost of financing for 
Chinese exporters and providing them with an advantage compared to those in the OECD. 
In addition, China is also believed to gain an advantage through longer grace and 
repayment periods than permitted under the Arrangement (EU 2011).  Extended repayment 
periods, like interest-rate subsidies, increase the attractiveness of financing.  Importers, who 
evaluate financing in terms of its present value, prefer longer repayment periods, which allow 
them to discount the loan over a longer period, as well as shifting risk to the lender 
17 Calculated based on Arrangement Country Risk Classifications (CRCs) as of June 25, 2018. 
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(Moravcsik 1989).  While the Arrangement stipulates a maximum repayment period of 8.5 or 
10 years for most loans, China’s loans usually come with a maturity of 12-15 years 
(Bräutigam 2011) and it is not unusual to see Chinese loans with terms of 20 years or more, 
and even as high as 28.5 years (Bräutigam and Gallagher 2014).  By offering longer loan 
tenure periods, China is able to provide more competitive financing, giving its exporters an 
advantage.  Similarly, loans with longer grace periods are also less costly to service.  While 
the Arrangement prohibits grace periods, China’s loans often include a grace period of 2-5 
years (Bräutigam 2011), which makes their terms considerably more favorable. 
China also appears to violate Arrangement rules through its use of “mixed credits”, or 
blended financing – combining standard export credit with development finance (grants or 
concessional loans at below-market rates) on the same transaction to produce an attractive 
financing package that gives its exporters an advantage in winning export contracts.  Tied aid 
(aid tied to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country, which can be used 
to circumvent the objectives of export credit disciplines) and mixed credits are strictly 
regulated by the Arrangement.  The Arrangement’s Helsinki Rules are intended to minimize 
the trade-distorting effects of tied aid and ensure it is directed towards genuine development 
purposes, by mandating minimum concessionality levels, preventing such financing from 
being used for projects in higher-income countries that can be financed commercially and 
ensuring it is instead exclusively used to support developmental projects in lower-income 
countries (Figure 2).  The Arrangement substantially curtailed the practice of using tied aid 
for export promotion by OECD countries (Hall 2011; Tvardek 2011).  However, China’s tied 
aid frequently takes the form of low-concessionality loans, which are most distortionary from 
a trade perspective and violate the terms of the Arrangement (Exim 2016).  China issues 
many large loans with tenors between 20-25 years, a 7-year grace period, and interest rates 
between 0-3% – terms which “likely fall outside the range permitted by OECD disciplines” 
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by violating the minimum 35% concessionality requirement (Exim 2014).  Furthermore, 
under the Arrangement, tied aid is only permitted for lower-middle and low income countries 
and non-commercially viable projects.  However, China has contravened Arrangement rules 
by extending concessional loans to commercially viable projects in upper-middle income 
countries (EU 2011).  Through its use of tied aid and mixed credits, China is thus providing 
more attractive financing terms than available under the Arrangement (EU 2011; Exim 2018). 
Rail equipment exports provide an illustration of how China’s ability to provide more 
favorable credit terms advantages its firms and buoys its industrial upgrading.  Representing 
an annual market of $120 billion, this is one of the ten priority industries that the Chinese 
government has targeted for overseas expansion as part of its effort to transform China into 
one of the world’s most competitive advanced manufacturers.  China has the world’s largest 
high-speed rail network and its firms now participate in hundreds of overseas rail projects.  In 
2015, China’s two state-owned railroad equipment makers (CSR Corp. and CNR Corp.) 
merged to create CRRC Corp., a $130 billion giant that is now the world’s second-largest 
industrial company, behind GE, and dwarfs rivals such as Siemens and France’s Alstom.  The 
motive behind the merger is to leverage economies of scale that will allow China to compete 
overseas even more aggressively.  China’s rail exporters have been targeting emerging 
markets in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, while also winning high-profile 
contracts in advanced countries.  According to analysts, although China’s rail technology is 
less sophisticated, its main competitive strength is that its technology is offered as part of a 
package that includes attractive export credit financing (Bloomberg 2015). 
Although it is extremely rare for the pricing terms of Chinese bids to become 
publically available, one of the few cases where such terms are known was a $500 million 
sale of rail locomotives to Pakistan:  while the Arrangement would require a minimum risk 
premium fee of approximately 21%, China Eximbank offered a fee of just 8% (Financial 
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Times 2011).  In another instance for which terms are known, CDB extended a $10 billion 
line of credit to Chinese rail equipment companies for sales to Argentina at LIBOR+6%, well 
below market rates that would be at least LIBOR+9.35% (Gallagher et al 2012).  The loan 
also involved a 19-year repayment period, violating the maximum loan tenor permitted by the 
Arrangement.  The Arrangement provides repayment terms of up to 12 years for railway 
infrastructure exports to developed countries and up to 14 years for developing countries, but 
China’s repayment terms for its rail exports often exceed 20 years (Akhtar 2015).  These 
differences in interest rates, fees and repayment terms provide China’s exports with a 
significant advantage over its OECD competitors and have helped to fuel the global 
expansion of its rail industry.   
Rail is just one of many industries in which China is using more favorable export 
credit terms to give its firms a competitive edge in global markets.  The telecommunications 
sector provides another example.  China Development Bank has provided one company alone 
– Huawei Technologies – with a massive $30 billion line of credit, enabling it to offer 
financing rates and terms that are unmatchable by competitors.  While transaction details are 
usually masked in secrecy, Brazil’s largest landline telephone company, Tele Norte, 
publically confirmed that it chose to purchase network equipment from Huawei rather than 
competing European and American suppliers specifically because of access to that financing, 
which CDB offered with an interest rate of about 4% (compared to market rates of about 6%) 
and a two-year grace period on payments (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012: 158).  America 
Movil, the largest mobile phone carrier in Latin America, likewise confirmed that access to 
below-market financing from CDB was its major reason for choosing Huawei for a $1 billion 
deal to upgrade its network (Hufbauer et al. 2011).  Huawei’s cheap credit line from CDB is 
seen as playing a similarly critical role in enabling the company to increase its sales to India 
from $50 million to $2.5 billion in just one year (Ezell 2011).  Fueled by such support, 
26 
 
Huawei has become the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, 
overtaking Ericsson, the European-based multinational, in 2012.  The global expansion of 
ZTE, China’s other major telecom equipment manufacturer, has been similarly driven by $25 
billion credit lines from CDB and China Eximbank.  An EU investigation found that “such 
facilities are a major selling point which enables ZTE to clinch deals on its export markets 
ahead of its competitors, while shifting the entirety or majority of its risk of payment onto the 
Chinese policy banks” (Wall Street Journal 2011).  China is thus using attractive export credit 
terms to fuel the global expansion of national champions. 
Other instances of China undercutting the terms of the Arrangement abound.  China 
Eximbank provided a $45 million loan to Jamaica for construction of a convention center at 
2% interest with a 20-year repayment period (Gallagher et al 2012); however, the 
Arrangement would require a minimum interest rate of approximately 5%, along with a 20% 
premium fee and a maximum loan tenor of 10 years.18  A Chinese company was awarded a 
contract to build a €170 million bridge in Serbia, without any call for tender, based on a loan 
from China Eximbank providing an interest rate of 3% and a 15-year repayment period (OA 
2010).  The Arrangement would require a minimum 5% interest rate plus premium fees of 
approximately 12-25% and a maximum 10-year repayment period.  Similarly, a $1.25 billion 
contract to modernize and expand a Serbian coal power plant was awarded to a Chinese 
company, CMCEC, with financing provided by China Exim at 3% interest over 15 years (OA 
2010).  The Arrangement, in contrast, would require approximately 4% interest plus premium 
fees of 12-25% and a maximum 12-year repayment period.  Other projects in Eastern Europe 
awarded to Chinese firms with ECA backing including several $500-750 million power 
plants, a €3 billion high-speed rail link between Belgrade and Budapest, and a €600 million 
highway.  In violation of the terms of the Arrangement, China is generally charging between 
18 Calculated based on historical CIRR and CRCs.     
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2-2.5% for these loans, with 20-30 year repayment periods (Karnitschnig 2017).  Eastern 
Europe is seen as a strategic entry point for Chinese companies in the European market, and 
Chinese ECAs are reportedly using aggressive financing practices to undercut competitors 
and expand their foothold in these markets (OA 2010; EU 2011).  
It is not necessary for all, or even most, of China’s export credit to be subsidized for it 
to pose a competitive threat to OECD countries or jeopardize the Arrangement.  By operating 
outside the Arrangement, China has maximum flexibility to adjust the terms and conditions 
of its financing, based on competitive conditions and its strategic interests.  As one ECA 
official stated:  “They like their flexibility and use it tremendously.”19  Chinese rates and 
lending terms vary considerably:  Chinese ECAs may often provide financing not far from 
Arrangement or market terms, but for strategically important transactions, they are able to 
undercut the Arrangement and use discounted financing to gain a competitive advantage 
(Exim 2006).  This is akin to a “loss leader” strategy – where an initial subsidy serves as an 
investment in winning subsequent sales – with China using cheap credit selectively to win 
key contracts that enable its firms to gain a foothold in a new market, establish their 
technology and technical standards, and develop brand recognition. 
OECD ECAs are receiving mounting complaints from their exporters that they are 
losing contracts to Chinese firms because of the more favorable financing packages the latter 
are able to offer.  According to an American business representative, “US multinationals are 
facing with greater frequency the problem of subsidized export credit financing from China 
in international tenders” (Schewel 2011b).  In the words of the US Export-Import Bank 
Chair:  “They’re winning deals in part because they’re not playing by the rules” (Reddy 
2011).  As one ECA official stated, “We’ve seen them coming in to areas where they are 
19 Interview, July 2015. 
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competing with our exporters, often with very cheap money, and often with tied 
agreements.”20  Another summarized:  “Everyone feels under attack.”21 
Given the massive volume of financing it is providing, incorporating China into 
global rule making and disciplines on export credit is a key priority of the US, EU and other 
advanced-industrialized states.  As the head of the US Eximbank put it, “it’s important that 
they play by the rules that everybody else is playing by” (Schewel 2011a).  However, such 
efforts have proven largely unsuccessful.  Although the US strongly pressed China to join the 
Arrangement, China refused.  Beijing has indicated that it will not join a set of rules that it 
played no role in creating and that do not reflect its development objectives.  China’s 
position, as articulated by Chen Deming, former Minister of Commerce, is that the OECD 
Arrangement “aims to solve the problem of international competition among developed 
countries and does not fully reflect the development concerns of developing countries” like 
China (Deming and Peiru 2016: 209).  As a developing country, he argues, China’s provision 
of export credit is distinct and it is not appropriate for China to join the Arrangement.  Thus, 
as OECD negotiators put it, “China has shown no interest in coming here” or “subjecting 
their export credit to these disciplines.”22   
Participants fear that China’s absence significantly undermines the Arrangement and 
reduces its effectiveness.  As one ECA official stated, “the big question on everyone’s mind 
now is whether the Arrangement is becoming obsolete.”23  A negotiator summed up the 
problem as follows: 
You have this Arrangement that’s worked well for decades and over time has 
gotten better and better as its disciplines bite more and more.   The problem is 
that they were universal rules – everyone who exported capital goods was a 
member – but now the world has completely changed. … China has 
traditionally been an exporter of consumer goods, but now there is almost no 
sector where China is not a major exporter of capital goods.  What happens to 
20 Interview, November 2016. 
21 Interview, July 2015. 
22 Interviews, June and July 2016. 
23 Interview, December 2017. 
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your export credit Arrangement if China is not a participant?  If the 
Arrangement is going to operate in a meaningful way, it has to involve all the 
major exporters of capital goods, meaning it has to involve China.  Everyone 
who exports capital goods needs to be part of the system or it can’t work.24  
 
Similarly, another participant echoed this in stating that, for the Arrangement to work 
effectively, “The major providers of export credit need to be there.  The Arrangement 
becomes pretty irrelevant pretty quickly if the world’s biggest exporter won’t participate.  
There’s no point agreeing on reciprocal restraint if doesn’t include all actors.”25  This has 
already begun to hamper the ongoing process of negotiations to continually strengthen the 
Arrangement.  Negotiators report that there are now many issues that “members don’t want to 
talk about” because “why would they agree to rules when China is not there and China is the 
biggest producer?”26  States are reluctant to commit themselves to any new disciplines that 
will not also bind China.   
International Working Group on Export Credits 
Thwarted in its efforts to convince China to join the Arrangement, the US tried a 
different tack.  In 2012, the US drove the creation of a new International Working Group on 
Export Credits (IWG), involving 18 major developed and developing countries, including 
China, to negotiate a successor to the OECD Arrangement.  This was a US-led initiative 
pushed at the highest levels that came out of the bilateral US-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue.  After many years of pressure by the US, following a meeting between President 
Barack Obama and soon to be President Xi Jinping, the two countries jointly announced 
agreement “to establish an international working group of major providers of export 
financing to make concrete progress towards a set of international guidelines on the provision 
of official export financing.”27  The resulting IWG came to include the nine participants in 
24 Interview, July 2016. 
25 Interview, July 2016. 
26 Interviews, June 2016. 




                                                 
the OECD Arrangement (the US, EU, Canada, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, New 
Zealand and Australia) as well as nine non-participants (the BRICS plus Indonesia, Israel, 
Malaysia and Turkey).  It was China that insisted on the participation of the eight other 
emerging economies, in order to ensure balance between developed and emerging economies 
and bolster its side in the negotiations by ensuring that it would not be outnumbered by the 
Arrangement participants.  As a result, compared to the Arrangement, the IWG is 
considerably more inclusive, in that nearly half of its participants are developing countries. 
From the perspective of the US and other developed countries, the IWG was a 
second-best solution:  as one negotiator stated, “we had dreamed of dragging China into the 
OECD Arrangement, but the failure of that effort is what led to the IWG.”28  Seeking to reign 
in export credit provision by China, the IWG represented an attempt by the US to maintain a 
liberal regime of export credit governance by replacing the Arrangement with a new version 
that would incorporate the major emerging economies.  The US identified this as a key 
strategic priority in its economic relations with China and, negotiators report, “pushed China 
very hard” to enter into and engage in the negotiations.29  As one US official stated, 
“Everyone’s hope are resting on the IWG – that it will be able to control China’s ability to 
take everyone’s lunch.”30  Other advanced-industrialized states have placed similar emphasis 
on the IWG as a means to create new, more universal rules on export credit. 
Yet, given the centrality of export credit to their development strategies, China and 
the other emerging economies have little incentive either to join existing governance 
arrangements or subject themselves to new disciplines that could inhibit their future growth 
prospects.  A representative of the US Chamber expressed it thus:  “Their economies depend 
on their ECAs.  I don’t see a world where they’re suddenly going to say ‘OK, we don’t need 
28 Interview, December 2017. 
29 Interview, July 2015. 
30 Interview, July 2015. 
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our ECAs’.  That’s just not realistic.”31  A party to the negotiations provided a similar 
assessment: 
China has vast resources – the amount of money available now is almost 
beyond belief.  Their view is ‘why the hell should we agree to not use these 
resources?  These guys are trying to constrain our ability to achieve our rightful 
place in the world.’  They don’t see anything in it for them.  It’s not in their 
interest to accept these constraints.  They provide so much export credit it’s 
astounding.  Beside the Chinese, the US Exim Bank looks like a corner bank in 
Aimes, Iowa.  China is doing this on a scale that just dwarfs what’s happening 
in the rest of the world.  Why should they let anyone stop them? 32 
 
Not only does export credit form part of China’s development strategy, but as China’s growth 
has slowed in recent years, it has increasingly sought to export its excess industrial capacity.  
In this context, China has little or no interest in accepting restrictions on its use of export 
finance.  
Consequently, despite significant pressure from the US, as well as other advanced-
industrialized states, there has been little progress in the IWG.  The IWG has held meetings 
every three to six months, but has been working at a “glacial pace” and yielded “negligible 
results” (Bergsten 2014).  According to participants, this is primarily due to resistance from 
China:  “China has been foot-dragging in meetings, slowing the process down and refusing to 
put any real proposals on the table.  If China wanted to do a deal, than we could move 
quickly, but the fact is it doesn’t.”33  Negotiators indicate that China has been “throwing up 
all kinds of process-based hurdles and obstructions” and “its actions indicate that it is not 
interested in moving forward.”34  As a result, there has been “very little movement” and 
“very little in the way of real negotiations.”35  
For the first three years of the IWG, China refused to engage in negotiations on a set 
of general, horizontal rules – the approach favored by the majority of participants.  Instead, 
31 Interview, July 2015. 
32 Interview, July 2016. 
33 Interview, June 2016. 
34 Interview, July 2015. 
35 Interviews, June 2016. 
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China insisted that the IWG should begin only with “discussions” of export credit practices in 
two specific industrial sectors.  At China’s insistence, the sectors chosen were ship-building – 
although the US and several other IWG members have no export credit activities in that 
sector – and medical equipment – a sector without any significant export credit intervention 
(as one participant put it, “not even a real sector” from the perspective of export credit).36  
China also insisted on keeping core issues related to export credit provision – such as interest 
rates, premiums and transparency – out of the discussion.  As a result, according to 
negotiators, the sectoral negotiations were “essentially useless” and “didn’t really mean 
anything.”37  It was not until 2015 that China even agreed to begin discussions on a general, 
horizontal system of rules.  In the words of one Western ECA official, “Now they’ve agreed 
to go to horizontal negotiations – it took 3 years to get to where we should have started in the 
first place.”38  And negotiators report that even now:  “There’s nothing in the negotiations 
yet” and no prospect of any agreement on the horizon.39   
As a result, many participants have significantly lowered their expectations for the 
IWG.  In the words of one senior US ECA official,  
What the US, EU and other OECD members want is a new version of the 
Arrangement – a comprehensive set of rules that incorporates the emerging 
economies.  But that’s exactly what China is not going to participate in.  
They’re not going to play that game – negotiating a new version of the 
Arrangement.  The best we can likely aim for is improved transparency.  That 
alone would be quite an accomplishment in the world we have today.40  
 
For the US and other advanced-industrialized states, improved transparency, even simply 
about what programs China is using, is an important objective of the IWG.  But negotiators 
report that even this has been a “huge struggle.”41  So far within the IWG, it is only the 
36 Interview, June 2016. 
37 Interviews, June 2015. 
38 Interview, July 2015. 
39 Interviews, June 2016. 
40 Interview, July 2015. 
41 Interview, June 2016. 
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OECD members that have shared this kind of information – something they are already doing 
under the Arrangement – while China has refused to provide comparable information on its 
own programs.   
One participant thus summed up the IWG negotiations as follows: “The process has 
been going on for years and there has been zero progress.”42  Efforts by the US and other 
advanced-industrialized states to engage China and the other BRICs in multilateral 
negotiations to create new restraints on export credit – or even to share basic information 
about their practices – have proven fruitless.  Though formally cooperating in the 
negotiations, China’s behavior has primarily served to subvert rather than advance the goal of 
arriving at a new set of disciplines.  It is a sign of China’s newfound power that it has been 
able to exert such control over the agenda, process and pace of the negotiations and refused to 
be pressured or coerced into accepting rules that it views as against its interests. 
The international regulatory regime for export credit has worked well for decades, but 
what was once a highly effective governance mechanism is now in danger of being subverted 
by the rise of new powers outside of that system.  In the contemporary world of export credit, 
to quote one ECA official, “China is the 800-pound gorilla.”43  Its substantial economic and 
political power have enabled China to act outside the bounds of the Arrangement and to resist 
pressures from the US and other traditional powers to agree to the creation of a new set of 
disciplines that would restrict its use of export credit.  As one negotiator bluntly put it, “China 
is the new actor breaking everything to pieces.”44  Among export credit practitioners, the rise 
of China and other emerging economies is therefore widely seen as the greatest single 
challenge to the existing governance regime. 
42 Interview, July 2016. 
43 Interview, July 2015. 
44 Interview, July 2016. 
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Inadequacy of WTO Disciplines 
Amid the weakening of the OECD Arrangement’s authority and the inability to reach 
agreement on a new version to replace it, one might expect the US and other advanced-
industrialized states to turn to the WTO to compel China and other emerging economies to 
reign in their use of export credit.  However, for the purposes of disciplining export credit, 
the WTO is a poor substitute for the Arrangement.  Export credit is covered by the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), which disciplines the use of 
export subsidies.  The OECD Arrangement is incorporated into the ASCM as a carve out to 
the illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies.  This operates as a “safe harbor clause”, 
ensuring that any use of export credit by a WTO member that is in conformity with the 
Arrangement’s disciplines will not be considered a prohibited export subsidy under WTO 
rules (Wright 2011).  Consequently, any WTO member who acts within the conditions set out 
in the Arrangement, regardless of whether they are a participant to it, is deemed to be in 
compliance with their WTO obligations (Shaffer et al. 2015). 
This means that, technically, the Arrangement’s disciplines are incorporated into 
WTO rules.  However, they are nearly impossible to enforce at the WTO.  Part of the reason 
the Arrangement was created in the first place is that the dispute settlement mechanism 
provided in the WTO, and its predecessor the GATT, is largely ineffective for disciplining 
export credit (Moravcsik 1989).  First, WTO dispute settlement is generally considered too 
cumbersome and not fast enough to work well in this area.  Given the lengthy nature of the 
WTO dispute settlement process, which often takes many years for a case to reach a 
conclusion, even if a country were to succeed in winning a determination that a competitor’s 
financing for a specific transaction constituted a prohibited export subsidy, the case would 
not be concluded until years after that transaction had been completed and its exporter had 
lost the contract.   
35 
 
Second, in contrast to the real time transparency provided by the Arrangement, the 
WTO contains no comparable mechanism for the routine exchange of detailed and 
confidential transaction data.  While Arrangement participants are required to share extensive 
information about their practices with one another, the export credit practices of non-
participants are generally secretive and non-transparent, with the result that their competitors 
lack detailed information about their export credit policies and programs as well as the 
specific terms of individual transactions.  This lack of information renders it extremely 
difficult to challenge export credit practices at the WTO. 
Third, each time a state provides export credit, whether or not it is considered a 
subsidy will depend on the specifics of that transaction.  As one negotiator stated, in order to 
challenge a state’s export credit policies at the WTO, “you would need to bring a systemic 
case, but the terms and conditions of each transaction are different, so it is difficult if not 
usually impossible to bring a systemic case.  Since it is very difficult to challenge a whole 
program, you would be left challenging individual transactions.”45  Consequently, there have 
to date been only two cases on (non-agricultural) export credit in the history of WTO dispute 
settlement – out of a total of over 500 disputes.46   
There are thus fundamental differences in how disciplines work in the Arrangement 
compared to the WTO, with crucial implications for the governance of export credit.  As one 
WTO official stated,  
The Arrangement works very well.  Our rules are completely different in how 
they work and what they do.  Short of prohibiting all use of export credit, 
there’s little the WTO can do.  Our structure and the way our rules work are 
not well-suited to this issue.  The system at the WTO really only works for 
broad systemic issues, and it is almost completely useless for dealing with 
export credit because it’s ex-post.  Our system would never provide the day-to-
day working and certainty of the OECD Arrangement.47 
 
45 Interview, July 2016. 
46 Brazil-Canada aircraft and EU-Korea shipbuilding. 
47 Interview, July 2016. 
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As a result of the way its rules and dispute settlement mechanism are designed and function, 
the WTO is ill-equipped to regulate export credit and cannot provide a viable alternative to 
the Arrangement. 
Thus, while it would be theoretically possible to use the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism to challenge the use of export credit by China and the other emerging economies, 
WTO trade lawyers indicate that in practice this would be “extraordinarily difficult if not 
usually impossible.”48  As one indicated: 
China’s use of export credit is potentially actionable at the WTO, yes.  But the 
reason they created the system for governing export credit in the OECD in the 
first place is because our rules [at the WTO] have some profound weaknesses.  
Here, it’s a 2-3 year process to take a case, plus 18 months of implementation, 
so maybe 5 years later – long after you have lost the contract – you could get a 
finding that the exporting country violated its WTO obligations.  But by then, 
it’s not like the transaction and the financing can be undone.  So, in theory, one 
could challenge China on export credit, you could litigate it for 5 years, but 
what would you have at the end of 5 years? 
 
In sum, “China could be vulnerable to a WTO challenge, but it would be expensive, take 
years to occur and be very hard to get a meaningful victory.”49  The WTO system is thus 
inadequate for disciplining state-backed export credit and provides little means for the US 
and other traditional powers to compel China to restrict its use of export credit. 
Conclusion 
As this article has shown, the global governance of export credit has been destabilized 
by the rise of China.  Analysis of the OECD Arrangement and IWG negotiations indicates 
that contemporary power shifts are making multilateral cooperation to govern export credit 
increasingly difficult.  From its hegemonic position, the US was the driving force behind the 
creation of the Arrangement and the continual strengthening of its disciplines; however, its 
current inability to press China into existing or new governance arrangements suggests the 
48 Interview, July 2016. 
49 Interview, July 2016. 
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capacity of the US to steer global rule-making is diminishing amid the rise of China.  China’s 
emergence as a major provider of government-backed trade financing has proven highly 
disruptive to the transparent, rule-bound, orderly system for the governance of export credit.  
Reluctant to relinquish an important industrial policy tool that is vital to its continued 
development, China has valid reasons to resist external disciplines on its use of export credit.  
But its unwillingness to either join existing governance arrangements or subject itself to new 
disciplines threatens what has until now been a highly effective regulatory regime and risks 
prompting a reemergence of destructive competition via export credit subsidies.  The case of 
export credit thus throws into stark relief the tension between the development objectives of 
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